Tier 1
×1The only rig you can make.
An on-chain mine on Arc. A rig earns a share of okei.fun’s real fee revenue every epoch, in proportion to its weight. It loses condition every epoch and earns less as it does. You cannot buy one — the only way in is to have paid fees already.
The contract is written and its test suite passes. It is not deployed, not audited, and no Silicon has been issued. Nothing on this page is live yet, and this notice comes down when that changes rather than quietly staying true.
Four steps, and each one feeds the next. The launchpad pays the pool, the pool pays the rigs, the rigs decay, and keeping them alive sends you back to the launchpad.
Wash trading makes volume cheaply and cannot make fees cheaply, because the fees are the cost.
The only way into the pit is to have already been a customer. There is no function that mints Silicon for money.
A pool split by share of weight cannot pay out more than exists. Falling returns are difficulty, not dilution.
Decay is the whole loop: it turns one fee payment into a standing reason to come back to the launchpad.
Weight is geometric in sixes. Five rigs carrying a total weight of 5 become one carrying 6 — that 20% is the entire reason to combine, and it costs a burned fee and four fewer repair transactions.
The only rig you can make.
5 rigs of weight 5 become one of weight 6.
25 tier-1 rigs, compressed.
125 tier-1 rigs, compressed.
625 tier-1 rigs, and 625 rigs of fees.
Tiers above 1 cannot be fabricated. The only route up is combining, so a tier-5 rig is always the compressed history of 625 tier-1 rigs — and therefore of 625 rigs’ worth of fees actually paid.
A rig at half condition earns half. A rig at zero earns nothing and stops counting toward the total, so it does not dilute anyone. Repairs are bought in notches — one notch is exactly one epoch of life, because you are buying weeks and not an abstract percentage.
One number, published, fixed for the season. Not a blend with exceptions — a share nobody can state in one sentence is a share nobody trusts.
GMX is the closest structural analogue — protocol revenue routed to holders who are not providing the liquidity. The other 60% is not profit; it is infra, audits, liquidity and the growth that expands the fee base everyone is paid from.
At the 24,000 USDC mainnet default. The live testnet factory is set to a 24 USDC target for testing, so it currently earns a thousandth of this.
Small numbers, and this page is not going to dress them up. The pool is whatever the launchpad earned, it can be zero, and nothing here borrows against future revenue or smooths a bad week — both are ways of promising a return the business did not make.
Not promises in a document — properties of the code, each with a test whose only job is to fail if it stops being true.
fund() is the only payable function and it is owner-only. Every $PLUSH spent here is burned, never routed to the pool. If rig spending funded the pool, early owners' returns would be paid by later owners' purchases — a ponzi in mechanism whatever the page calls it, and it collapses the moment inflow slows.
Fabrication costs Silicon, and Silicon is only ever earned by paying fees on okei.fun. It is non-transferable, has no market, and there is no function that mints it for money. The only entry is having already traded.
It removes the circularity and it removes the purchase. It does not make OrePit obviously not a security, and this page will not pretend otherwise. Someone holds an asset, does modest upkeep, and receives dollars generated largely by someone else’s business — that is recognisably the shape regulators look at. What can be said honestly is that the yield is bounded by real revenue rather than new deposits, no money enters from a player in any function, entry requires having paid fees, ownership requires ongoing action, and nothing is promised.